How Many Times Must the Question Be Answered? The Application of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation by Ravetta, Stacey Leffler
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 2 Women's Law Forum Article 5
January 2000
How Many Times Must the Question Be
Answered? The Application of the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine in the Norplant
Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation
Stacey Leffler Ravetta
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stacey Leffler Ravetta, How Many Times Must the Question Be Answered? The Application of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the
Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 30 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2000).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss2/5
NOTE 
HOW MANY TIMES MUST THE 
QUESTION BE ANSWERED? THE 
APPLICATION OF THE LEARNED 
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE IN 
THE NORPLANTCONTRACEPTIVE 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
LITIGATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation1 
("Norplant Litigation") was lengthy and complex multidistrict 
litigation involving the prescription Norplant Contraceptive 
Device ("Norplant,,).2 Since the introduction of the first oral 
contraceptives in the late 1960s, the first Intrauterine Devices 
("IUDs") in the 1970s, and Norplant in the 1990s, women expe-
rienced various adverse side effects when using any of these 
methods to prevent pregnancy.3 Many women who suffered 
negative reactions brought lawsuits against the pharmaceuti-
1 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374 (5th 
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation 11"]. 
2 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 
(E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation 1]. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
165 F.3d at 374. 
3 . See generally MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 
1985); Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); In 
re AH. Robins Co. Inc., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 505 F. 
Supp. 221 (J.P.M.L. 1981); Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1999). 
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cal companies under products liability theories.4 The results of 
the lawsuits varied depending on the jurisdictions in which the 
they were filed and the types of injuries the women sustained.6 
Similarly, in the Norplant Litigation, the plaintiffs alleged 
various side effects and claimed that the defendant did not 
provide adequate warnings of the potential risks.6 The com-
plaints against Norplant's manufacturer, Wyeth Laboratories, 
and its parent company, American Home Products (collectively 
"AHP") focused on twenty-six adverse reactions common to the 
majority of the plaintiffs. 7 
The primary issue presented in the Norplant Litigation was 
the federal district court's decision to apply the learned inter-
mediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims 
against AHP.B Since Norplant was a relatively new method of 
contraception at the time of the litigation, the court had lim-
ited binding precedent to apply to the facts of the plaintiffs' 
case.
9 Therefore, the court looked to similar cases involving 
prescription drugs and concluded that it should apply the 
learned intermediary doctrine to all of the plaintiffs' claims. 10 
As a result of this determination, the court held that the de-
4 See generally MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65; Reaves, 765 F. Supp. 1287; Dalkon 
Shield, 505 F. Supp. 221; Perez, 734 A.2d 1245. 
6 See generally MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65; Reaves, 765 F. Supp. 1287; Dalkon 
Shield, 505 F. Supp. 221; Perez, 734 A.2d 1245. 
6 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 702. 
7 See Defendant's No.2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment He Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling at 2, Norplant Contraceptive Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038). 
8 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 702. The plaintiffs claimed that the de-
fendant's failure to adequately warn of Norplant's side effects gave rise to liability 
under numerous theories including: strict liability, negligence, misrepresentation, 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and under the Texas Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act ("DTPA"). See id. at 703. 
9 
See id. at 703. Since the federal district court's jurisdiction over the Norplant 
Litigation was based on diversity of citizenship, the court applied Texas law to the 
case. See id. 
10 See id. at 704. The court looked to Texas court decisions ~nvolving prescription 
drugs and the decisions of other states regarding the treatment of failure-to-warn 
claims specifically involving prescription contraceptives since the Texas courts had 
ruled on that issue See id. at n.18. 
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fendant was insulated from liability to the plaintiffs for the 
adverse reactions they experienced as a result of using N or-
plant. l1 Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment 
in AHP's favor. 12 On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling. 13 
Part II of this Note begins with a general discussion of fail-
ure to warn causes of action and the application of the learned 
intermediary doctrine thereto. Further, Part II discusses cases 
essential to understanding the background of the Norplant 
Litigation. Next, Parts III and IV explain the facts and proce-
dural history underlying the Norplant Litigation. Part V first 
examines the federal district court's analysis of the case. It 
then discusses the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the federal dis-
trict court's summary judgment ruling in AHP's favor. Part VI 
examines the federal district c\:mrt's pivotal decision to apply 
the learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claims 
against AHP, and the Fifth Circuit's decision to affirm this 
ruling, thereby effectively ending the litigation. Further, Part 
VI also notes that direct-to-consumer advertising creates a new 
and unprecedented issue in failure to warn product liability 
cases involving prescription drugs. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Norplant is comprised of synthetic hormones that prevent 
pregnancy. 14 These hormones potentially cause adverse side 
effects. 15 The Norplant Litigation began when women experi-
encing side effects sought to certify a nationwide class of per-
sons who suffered or may suffer injury as a result of using 
Norplant against the device's manufacturer, Wyeth Laborato-
11 See id. at 701. 
12 See id. 
13 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375. 
14 
See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374, 376 
(5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation 11"]. 
15 
See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700, 
702 CE.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant ~itigation rJ. 
3
Ravetta: Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
334 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
ries, Inc., and its parent company, American Home Products 
(collectively "AHP,,).16 The plaintiffs claimed that AHP was 
liable for failing to adequately warn them of the risks inherent 
in Norplant use. 17 Both the federal district court and the Fifth 
Circuit applied the learned intermediary doctrine to the plain-
tiffs' claims, thereby insulating AHP from liability for failing to 
warn the ultimate consumer. IS An examination of the author-
ity relied on by both courts in the Norplant Litigation illus-
trates the complexity and longevity of the central legal issue 
presented in this litigation: the application of the learned in-
termediary doctrine and its continuing impact on a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer's liability for failing to directly warn 
consumers of the risks associated with its products.19 
A. THE NORPLANT CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICE 
In 1991, AHP introduced Norplant to the birth control mar-
ket after more than two decades of development and testing.20 
Norplant consists of six thin, match-stick size, silicone-coated, 
capsules of synthetic progesterone, called levonorgestrel, in-
serted just below the skin of a woman's upper arm.21 Norplant 
may remain in place for up to five years, and while implanted, 
constantly releases a small, continuous dose of levonorgestrel 
16 . See ,d. 
17 
See id. 
IS See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
165 F.3d at 375. 
19 See Norplant Litigati~n I, 955 F. Supp. at 704-705 (citing MacDonald v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985); Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 
1264 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
20 See Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 713 A.2d 588, 589 (N.J. Law Div. 1997). 
The Population Council, a non-profit organization committed to the advancement of 
reproductive health developed Norplant. The Population Council began development 
of Norplant in 1966 and tested it on over 55,000 women in forty-four cou~tries over 
the following two decades. The Population Council granted Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 
the exclusive right to market Norplant in the United States. See id. 
n .. See Planned Parenthood FederatIon of AmerIca, Inc., Fact Sheet: Norplant and 
You (1997). Levonorgestal is the term for synthetic progesterone hormone. See id. 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss2/5
2000] LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE 335 
into the blood stream.22 Levonorgestrel prevents pregnancy by 
keeping the ovaries from releasing eggs and thickens the cervi-
cal mucus, which impedes sperm from joining with an egg.23 In 
addition, some researchers believe that Norplant may also 
prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to the lining of a 
woman's uterus.24 Norplant is a highly effective contraceptive, 
as demonstrated by statistics revealing-that of everyone hun-
dred women who use the device for five years, fewer than four 
will become pregnant.25 
Although Norplant is highly effective, women often experi-
ence various negative reactions due to the hormonal nature of 
the device.26 A Norplant user's bloodstream carries the addi-
tionallevonorgestrel to the pituitary gland in the brain and to 
the uterus and cervix.27 Due to the increased level of proges-
terone in a woman's body, she ml:l.Y experience side effects in-
cluding, but not limited to, various combinations of severe 
headaches, mood swings, depression, nausea, acne, arm pain, 
numbness, breast tenderness, weight gain, hair loss, cramps, 
and menstrual cycle irregularities.28 Physicians prescribing a 
synthetic hormone-based contraceptive such as Norplant must 
inform their patients that using the device to prevent preg-
nancy may include the risk of experiencing other side effects.29 
1. Failure to Warn Claims 
The general rule regarding failure to warn claims is that 
inadequate warnings by a pharmaceutical manufacturer ren-
der a product defective and may result in the manufacturer's 
22 S 'd ee I • 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 S 'd ee I . 
26 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 702. 
27 .. See Planned Parenthood FederatIon of Amenca, Inc., Fact Sheet: Norplant and 
You (1997). 28 . 
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375. 
29 
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707. 
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liability for damages.3o A prima facie failure to warn claim re-
quires a plaintiff to prove: first, that a manufacturer failed to 
provide prescribing physicians and other healthcare providers 
with adequate warnings and instructions regarding its prod-
uct; and second, that this failure to warn directly caused the 
plaintiff's injury.31 
Therefore, warnings to physicians are adequate if the pre-
scription drug manufacturer clearly conveys to the medical 
community any risk that it knows or should know are associ-
ated with a particular drug.32 If warnings are deemed inade-
quate, a manufacturer may be liable directly to a patient for a 
breach of its duty to warn of the risks inherent in using its 
product.33 However, in most failure to warn cases, prescription 
drug manufacturers are insulated from liability by the learned 
. t d' d . 34 In erme lary octnne. 
2. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
The learned intermediary doctrine insulates a prescription 
drug manufacturer from the legal duty to warn consumers di-
rectly of a product's risk if it adequately warns prescribing 
physicians.35 This doctrine is based on the premise that physi-
cians, who have an established and informed relationship with 
patients, are ultimately responsible for prescribing the manu-
facturer's products.36 The foundation of the doctrine rests on 
the assumption that physicians are significantly more capable 
than the lay consumer of understanding the complex pharma-
30 See Restatement (Third) of Torts §6A (Proposed Final Draft 1997). 
31 See id. The causation requirement in failure to warn claims is similar to the 
proximate cause requirement for ordinary negligence claims. See id. 
32 See Catherine A. Paytash, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient Pack-
age Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 
1343, 1345 (1999). 
33 See id. 
34. . Restatement (Third) of Torts §6A (Proposed Fmal Draft 1997). 
35 Paytash, supra note 32 at 1345. 
36 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1967). 
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cology of a drug as it relates to the medical history of a par-
ticular patient.37 
a. The Seminal Case: Sterling Drug Inc. v. Cornish 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
introduced the learned intermediary doctrine in Sterling Drug, 
Inc. v. Cornish38 in 1966.39 In Sterling, the plaintiff brought a 
failure to warn claim against the manufacturer of the arthritis 
drug Aralen.40 She claimed that the defendant manufacturer 
failed to adequately warn her of the possible risks of taking the 
drug. 41 As a result of taking Aralen for four years, the plain-
tiff developed a condition known as chloroquine retinopathy.42 
This condition caused the plaintiff to suffer permanent vision 
impairment.43 In 1960, two years after the plaintiff began 
taking the drug, the manufacturer distributed revised product 
information cards to physicians, which included warnings that 
Aralen may cause retinal damage.44 Further, as studies link-
ing the drug to retinal damage became more definitive, the 
manufacturer began sending letters to doctors to specifically 
call attention to the potential side effects.45 
The question presented to the jury on appeal was whether 
the defendant manufacturer provided adequate warnings of 
the possible adverse side effects of Aralen to prescribing physi-
cians, thereby making the doctors learned intermediaries be-
37 Paytash, supra note 32 at 1345. 
38 See Sterling, 370 F.2d at 82. 
39 See id. at 83. 
40 See id. Aralen was used widely and effectively in the treatment of arthritis but 
produced chloroquine retinopathy in a small percentage of users. See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See Sterling, 370 F.2d at 84. Chloroquine retinopathy is a degeneration or de-
struction of ertain cells in the retina of the eye caused by the chloroquine chemical in 
Aralen. Chloroquine retinopathy often results in irreversible blindness. See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
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tween it and consumers.46 The Eighth Circuit held that the 
trial court correctly concluded that reasonable men could dis-
agree as to the adequacy of the defendant manufacturer's 
warnings.47 Therefore, whether the defendant manufacturer or 
pharmaceutical company provided adequate warnings to the 
prescribing physicians was a question of fact for the jury.48 
Thus, if the jury found that the defendant manufacturer pro-
vided adequate warnings to prescribing physicians, the learned 
intermediary doctrine applied and, therefore, the pharmaceuti-
cal company was not liable to the plaintiff for failing to directly 
warn her of the possible adverse side effects of its products.49 
b. Judicial History of Prescription Drug Products Liability 
Litigation Involving the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Mter Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, courts in other United 
States jurisdictions continued to apply the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine to failure to warn claims involving a variety of 
prescription drugs. 50 As the doctrine expanded, courts began to 
carve out exceptions to the doctrine. 51 These exceptions in-
46 
See id. at 85. 
47 
See id. 
48 
See Sterling, 370 F.2d at 84. 
49 
See id. at 85. 
50 
See generally Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. 
Mich. 1991); Terhune v. AH. Robins Co., 90 Wash 2d 9 (1978); Spychala v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A2d 
398 (Del. 1989); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1991); Allen v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988); West v. Searle & Co., (304 Ark. 33 (1991); Martin 
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 169 Ill.2d 234 (1996); Humes v. Clinton, 246 Kan. 590 
(1990). 
51 
See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). The Reyes court 
created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for mass vaccinations. See 
id. See also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). 
The MacDonald court created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for 
prescription oral contraceptives. See id. See also Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 
734 A2d 1245 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999). The Perez court created an exception to the doc-
trine when the manufacturer of Norplant advertised the device directly to consumers. 
See id. 
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clude mass vaccinations, prescription contraceptives and di-
rect-to-consumer advertising. 52 
B. EXCEPTION FOR MAss VACCINATIONS 
In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,53 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a polio vaccine manu-
facturer had a duty to warn recipients directly of the possible 
risks of its vaccine since it knew that physicians did not act as 
learned intermediaries.54 In Reyes, the plaintiffs infant 
daughter contracted polio subsequent to receiving a few drops 
of Sabin oral polio vaccine at a Texas county health clinic.55 A 
registered nurse administered the vaccine to the infant with-
out a doctor present. 56 The defendant manufacturer provided a 
warning circular with each vial of the vaccine to warn doctors, 
hospitals or other health care providers of the potential dan-
gers of ingesting the vaccine.57 Although the nurse who ad-
ministered the vaccine to the infant read the warning circular, 
she testified that she did not warn Mrs. Reyes of the risks of 
the vaccine since it was not the practice of the clinic nurses to 
pass the manufacturer's warnings on to the patients and their 
58 parents. 
52 
See Reyes, 498 F.2d 1264. See also MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65. See also Perez, 
734 A. 2d 1245. 
53 
See Reyes, 498 F.2d 1264. 
54 See id. at 1277. 
55 
See id. at 1270. As a result of the polio, Anita Reyes was completely paralyzed 
from the waist down, her left arm became atrophied, and she was unable to control 
her bladder or bowel movements. See id. 
56 
See id. 
57 
See id. Each vial contained 10 doses of the vaccine. See id. 
58 
See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1270. Mrs. Reyes testified that she was not warned of the 
possible dangers of the polio vaccine. She had seventh grade education and spoke 
primarily Spanish. She signed a form releasing the State of Texas for all liability in 
connection with the vaccination which did not include any warning of potential risks of 
the vaccine. The Court of Appeal concluded she either did not read the form or did not 
have the linguistic ability to understand its significance. See id. 
9
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The Reyes court determined that the defendant manufac-
turer knew that a great majority of its polio vaccines were ad-
ministered in mass immunizations or at county health clinics 
staffed, at least in part, by volunteers.59 Further, the court 
assumed that the defendant manufacturer knew that non-
physician medical professionals administered the drug in an 
assembly line fashion, and thus did not dispense the vaccine in 
the same manner as ordinary prescription drugs.60 The court 
emphasized that in such cases, the medical personnel dis-
pensing the vaccine did not make individualized medical 
judgments as to whether the vaccine was appropriate for par-
ticular patients.61 Therefore, in Reyes, a physician did not as-
sume a learned intermediary role, since no physician actually 
passed along manufacturer warnings to parents before admin-
istering the vaccine.62 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the defendant manufacturer had a duty to directly warn 
vaccine recipients of the potential risks inherent in using its 
d 63 pro uct. 
C. EXCEPTION FOR ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES 
In MacDonald u. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,64 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that manufacturers of oral 
contraceptives owe a direct duty to consumers to warn of the 
dangers inherent in the use its products.65 In MacDonald, the 
plaintiff suffered a stroke that left her permanently disabled 
after she used defendant's birth control pills for three years.66 
Although MacDonald testified that she read all of the manu-
59 See id. at 1277. A witness for the defendant testified that it was common indus-
try knowledge that county clinics were stocked primarily by sale of the vaccine to state 
health departments. See id. 60 . See td. 
61 . See td. 
62 . See Id. 
63 
See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277. 
64 
See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985). 
65 See id. at 65. 
66 See id. at 67. 
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facturer's warnings and received limited warnings from her 
physician, she maintained she was unaware that using oral 
contraceptives increased her risk of suffering a stroke.67 Fur-
ther, MacDonald claimed that she would not have used the 
birth control pill had she known of this associated risk.68 The 
MacDonald court agreed that the learned intermediary doc-
trine should not apply to the plaintiffs claim, reasoning that 
oral contraceptives bear particular characteristics that war-
rant imposing a duty upon the manufacturer to directly warn 
users of associated risks.69 These particular characteristics 
include the patient's active participation in the selection of a 
particular contraceptive method, the serious and substantial 
risks inherent in the nature of oral contraceptives, and the 
possibility of insufficient communication between patients and 
physicians regarding the risks of the drug. 70 Further, because 
of the unique nature of oral contraceptives, manufacturers 
cannot rely on solely doctors to provide patients with warnings 
of the risks inherent in the use of their products.71 Thus, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that pharmaceutical com-
panies must provide consumers with direct written warnings 
of the potential risks of using oral contraceptives.72 In addi-
tion, manufacturers must advise consumers to see a physician 
67 
See id. 
68 . See Id. The plaintiff testified that her doctor warned her that the pills might 
cause bloating, but made no mention of the risk of stroke. See id. at 68. Each pill 
dispenser included a label with a warning that "oral contraceptives are powerful and 
effective drugs, which can cause side effects in some users and should not be used by 
some women" and that "the most serious known side effect is abnormal blood clotting 
which can be fatal". See id. at 66. Ortho's information booklet, provided by Mac-
Donald's gynecologist contained additional information about blood clots but, failed to 
mention the word "stroke". The booklet included warnings that blood clots occasion-
ally form in the blood vessels of the legs and pelvis of apparently healthy people and 
may threaten life if the clots break loose and then lodge in the lung or if clots form in 
other vital organs, such as the brain. Further, Ortho estimated that about one woman 
in 2,000 on the pill each year suffers blood clotting severe enough to require hospitali-
zation. See id. at 67. 
69 See MacDonald, 475 N.E. 2d at 67. 
70 
See id. at 69. 
71 . See Id. at 70. 
72 See id. 
11
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for additional information regarding the risks inherent in the 
use of oral contraceptives. 73 
However, despite the willingness of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court to create an exception to the learned intermediary 
doctrine for prescription contraceptives, other courts are not 
willing to go that far. 74 For example, in Reaves v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corporation,75 the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan held that the manufacturer of 
an oral contraceptive was not required to directly warn con-
sumers of risks associated with the use of its product. 76 In 
Reaves, the plaintiff used the defendant's Ortho-Novum 1150 
oral contraceptive for almost 13 years. 77 Subsequently, the 
plaintiff developed arterial thromboembolism in her leg.78 The 
plaintiff stopped using the drug after her doctor advised her 
that it was the likely cause of her condition. 79 Due to complica-
tions caused by the condition, the plaintiffs leg was eventually 
amputated just below her knee.80 As a result, the plaintiff 
sued the manufacturer for failing to warn her of the potential 
side effects of the oral contraceptive.81 Relying on MacDonald, 
the plaintiff argued that because of the particular characteris-
tics of oral contraceptives, the defendant manufacturer had a 
duty to directly warn her of the risks inherent in using its 
d 82 pro uct. 
73 See id. The warnings must include notice of the nature, gravity and likelihood of 
known or knowable side effects. See id. 
74 See MacDonald, 475 N.E. 2d at 70. 
75 See Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
76 See id. at 129l. 
77 See id. at 1288. The plaintiff used an oral contraceptive manufactured by the de-
fendant almost continuously from 1973 to 1986. A physician typically refilled her 
prescription for six months to one year without medical evaluation. See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. Arterial thromboemolism is a blood clotting disorder. See id. 
80 See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1288. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
12
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Since the federal district court did not have any precedent 
to apply in this case, the court held an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the learned intermediary doctrine applied 
to oral contraceptives.83 At the hearing, the defendant called a 
distinguished physician to support its argument that the 
learned intermediary doctrine should apply to the plaintiffs 
failure to warn claim.84 The witness testified that a physician's 
participation in prescribing oral contraceptives is active since 
it is common practice to examine a patient prior to prescribing 
the drug to determine if she is likely to be a successful user of 
oral contraceptives.85 In addition, the defendant's witness 
stated that physicians typically evaluate a patient's personal 
and family medical history to determine potential risk 
factors. 86 Further, physicians perform a physical examination 
and perform certain tests to ascertain any preexisting condi-
tions that may preclude successful use, and counsel patients as 
to the side effects, risks and benefits of using oral contracep-
tives.87 The physician concluded by stating that oral contra-
ceptives are the same as any other prescription drug in that 
patients are unlikely to understand the technical medical in-
formation regarding the nature of the drug.88 
In response, the plaintiff called an expert witness to sup-
port her argument that the learned intermediary doctrine 
should not apply to her failure to warn claim.89 The plaintiffs 
physician witness testified that manufacturers are in the best 
position to know the potential risks of its products and thus 
are best able to warn patients.9o However, based on the testi-
mony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the federal district 
court disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that the learned 
83 
See id. at 1290. 
84 
See id. 
85 
See Reaves,765 F. Supp. at 1290. 
86 
See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1291. 
13
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intermediary doctrine should not apply to her claim, and held 
that oral contraceptives are indistinguishable from other pre-
scription drugs.91 Thus, since physicians play an active role in 
prescribing prescription contraceptives, the Reaves court de-
clined to follow MacDonald's exception to the doctrine.92 In-
stead, the court held that the defendant manufacturer was not 
liable to plaintiff for failing to warn her directly of the risks 
associated with the use of its product.93 
D. EXCEPTION FOR DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 
Although the issue of direct-to-consumer advertising was 
not directly addressed in the Norplant Litigation,94 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court faced the issue in a later case against 
AHP regarding Norplant.95 In 1999, in Perez v. Wyeth Labora-
tories, Inc.,96 the New Jersey Supreme Court created an excep-
tion to the learned intermediary doctrine in failure to warn 
claims when the defendant manufacturer engaged in direct-to-
consumer advertising.97 In Perez, the plaintiffs argued that the 
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their failure 
to warn claim against AHP because the advertisement warn-
ings were inadequate.98 The defendant manufacturer, Wyeth 
Laboratories, Inc. (''Wyeth"), advertised Norplant in women's 
magazines such as Glamour, Mademoiselle and 
Cosmopolitan.99 These advertisements praised the simplicity 
91 See id. 
92S 'd ee, . 
93 See id. 
94 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 708. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
learned intermediary doctrine does not apply when a manufacturer directly advertis-
ing its products to consumers. The Federal District Court did not address this issue 
because the plaintiffs admitted they did not see any of AHP's advertisements before 
the implantation with Norplant. See id. 
95 See Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
96 S 'd ee, . 
97 . See ,d. at 1245. 
98 See id. at 1248. 
99 . See ,d. 
14
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and convenience of N orplant as a birth control method, but 
failed to mention the dangers inherent in using the actual de-
vice. 100 The plaintiffs claimed Norplant caused them to suffer 
adverse side effects, including weight gain, headaches, dizzi-
ness, nausea, diarrhea, acne, vomiting, fatigue, facial hair 
growth, numbness in the arms and legs, irregular menstrua-
tion, hair loss, leg cramps, anxiety, vision problems, anemia, 
mood swings and depression, high blood pressure and removal 
complications that resulted in scarring.101 
Wyeth argued that the learned intermediary doctrine 
should apply to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim despite its 
direct-to-consumer marketing campaign.102 The trial court and 
the appellate division both ruled that the learned intermediary 
doctrine applied to the plaintiffs' claim because the plaintiffs 
failed to show that the manufacturer's provided inadequate 
warnings to the prescribing physicians.103 Despite the fact that 
the plaintiffs conceded that they were not influenced by the 
defendant's advertisements, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the decisions of the lower courts, con-
cluding that the consumer-directed advertising of pharmaceu-
ticals undermines the foundational premises of the learned 
intermediary doctrine. 104 The court discussed several ration-
ales to support its conclusion. lOS First, Wyeth's direct-to-
consumer advertising of Norplant demonstrated that consum-
ers participated directly in their health care decisions.106 This 
patient participation invalidates the premise that it is the phy-
sician, rather than the patient, who decides which contracep-
tive method to use.107 In addition, the court found it illogical to 
conclude that requiring manufacturers to provide direct 
100 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248. 
101 
See id. 
102 See id. at 1260. 
103 
See id. at 1249 
104 See id. at 1256. 
105 
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256. 
106 
See id. 
107 See id. 
15
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warnings to a consumer will undermine the patient-physician 
relationship. lOB The court held that by its very nature, con-
sumer-directed advertising encroaches on the patient-
physician relationship by encouraging patients to ask for prod-
ucts by name. 109 Next, the court noted that consumer-directed 
advertising rebuts the notion that prescription drugs and de-
vices and their potential adverse effects are too complex to be 
effectively communicated to consumers.uo Finally, the court 
concluded that since the Federal Drug Administration ("FDA") 
requires prescription drugs and devices to carry warnings, the 
consumer may reasonably presume that the advertiser guaran-
tees the adequacy of its warnings. 111 Thus, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the learned intermediary doctrine 
should not apply to the plaintiffs claim against AHP.112 
III. FACTS UNDERLYING THE N ORPLANT CONTRACEPTIVE 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
In 1995, the Norplant plaintiffs sought class certification, 
alleging that AHP failed to provide adequate warnings con-
cerning the possible side effects from using Norplant.113 Collec-
tively, the various plaintiffs attributed over 950 different side 
lOB See id, 
109 
See id. 
110 
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256 
111 S 'd ee I • 
112 S 'd ee I , 
113 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996 
WL 264731 at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 17,1996) 
16
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effects to their use of the device.114 However, the majority of 
the plaintiffs complained of twenty-six adverse reactions. 115 
Prior to prescribing Norplant, the plaintiffs' prescribing 
physicians received informational brochures and package in-
serts directly from AHP, which warned of the possible risks of 
using Norplant.116 Specifically, AHP listed the twenty-six ad-
verse reactions alleged by the plaintiffs. ll7 AHP listed the risk 
of irregular menstrual bleeding, the most common side effect 
alleged by the plaintiffs, first in its warning materials.118 Spe-
cifically, AHP warned the prescribing physicians that 27.6% of 
women using Norplant may experience many bleeding days or 
prolonged bleeding during the first year of use.119 
114 See Defendant's No.2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling at 1, In re Norplant Contraceptive 
Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038).. The 
plaintiffs attributed over 950 conditions to the use of Norplant including, but not lim-
ited to: body odor, drug addition, evil thoughts, change in finger nail color, loss of 
logical reasoning, stretch marks, tapeworms, toothache and tuberculosis. See id. 
115 See id. at 2. Nearly all of the 30,000 plaintiffs complained of irregular men-
strual bleeding. The 26 core conditions included: bleeding irregularities including 
prolonged bleeding, spotting, amenorrhea (absence of menstruation), irregular onset of 
bleeding, frequent bleeding onsets, and scanty bleeding, infection at implant site, pain 
or itching at implant site, removal difficulties, headaches, nervousness, nausea, dizzi-
ness, adnexal enlargement, dermatitis (inflammation of the skin), acne, change in 
appetite, mastalgia (breast swelling and tenderness), weight gain, hair loss and hair 
growth, breast discharge, crevicitis (inflammation of the neck of the cervix), musculo-
skeletal pain, abdominal discomfort, leukorrhea (a white, thick vaginal discharge) and 
vaginitis (vaginal infection). See id. 
116 See id. at 3. The warning information provided by AHP included all of the 26 
core adverse reactions, together with statistics as to how often the side effects oc-
curred during controlled clinical studies involving Norplant. See id. 
117 
See id. at 3. 
118 See id. at 12. 
119 
See Defendant's No.2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling at 3, In re Norplant Contraceptive 
Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038). AHP 
emphasized the possibility of irregular menstrual bleeding because the Norplant clini-
cal trials revealed that irregular menstrual bleeding was the most common reason for 
women discontinuing the use of the device. See id. 
17
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IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 6, 1994, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation 120 assigned all pending federal claims against AHP 
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas, Beaumont Division as Multidistrict Litigation 1038 
("MDL 1038") for consolidated and coordinated discovery and 
pretrial proceedings.121 After the initial consolidation in the 
Eastern District of Texas, four hundred additional cases were 
also added to MDL 1038.122 During the coordination of the pre-
trial proceedings, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certifi-
cation on behalf of all women in the United States who experi-
enced problems associated with their use of Norplant.123 
On May 17, 1996, the federal district court stayed the plain-
tiffs' Motion for Class Certification pending the Fifth Circuit's 
120 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(d) Section 1407(d) states: The Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation shall consist of seven circuit and district judges designated from 
time to time by the Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from 
the same circuit. The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any action by 
the panel. See id. 
121 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 878 F. Supp. 
972, 973 (E.D. Tex. 1995). See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(a). Section 1407(a) specifically 
states: When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pend-
ing in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordi-
nated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation authorized by this section upon its determination 
that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses 
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so trans-
ferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial pro-
ceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previ-
ously terminated. See id. 
122 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996 
WL 264731 at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 17,1996). 
123 . 
See id. Plaintiffs filed 'their Motion for Class Certification on March 9, 1995. 
See id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) outlines the prerequisites for a class 
action lawsuit: One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. See id. 
18
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decision in Castano v. American Tobacco Company,124 con-
cerning the necessary court procedures prior to granting class 
certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
("FRCP,,).125 Following Castano, the federal district court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and in-
stead held that it would first conduct bellwether126 trials to de-
termine the appropriateness of class certification for the Nor-
plant Litigation plaintiffs.127 Upon the completion of the bell-
wether trials, the plaintiffs could refile their Class Certifica-
tion Motion. 128 
124 See Castano v. American Tobacco Company, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that individual trials are necessary prior to apply-
ing the predominance test under Rule 23(b)(3) of the FRCP. Individual trials are 
necessary so as to allow the court to make an informed decision regarding whether 
common issues predominate and whether class certification is superior to other meth-
ods for handling the litigation. See id. 
125 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996 
WL 264731 at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 17,1996). The Federal District Court knew that the 
Fifth Circuit was considering many class certification issues similar to those presented 
in the Norplant litigation in Castano v. American Tobacco Company. See also Cas-
tano, 84 F.3d at 734. Specifically, Castano addressed issues related to the viability of 
a nationwide class in a products liability case in the Fifth Circuit, and the proper 
method for applying the predominance test under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See id at 750. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) is called 
into question if the prerequisites to a class action are met as set forth in 23(a) and the 
provisions of 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are also satisfied. Following Rule 23(b)(3), an action 
may be maintained as a class action if: the court finds that questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is super to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. See id. 126 See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997). The term 
bellwether derives from the ancient practice of belling a wether (a male sheep) se-
lected to lead his flock. The ultimate success of the wether selected to wear the bell 
was determined by the confidence of the flock that the wether would not lead them 
astray. The same notion applies to the class action concept. A bellwether trial helps 
the court to determine if the claims tried are representative of a larger group of claims 
from which they are selected. The bellwether trial is meant to permit the court to 
reach a sufficient level of confidence that the results obtained in the bellwether trial 
would be obtained from trial involving the whole class. See id. 127 
See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 577, 
578 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Castano, 84 F.3d at 734). 128 
See id. 
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The federal district court determined that in the interest of 
fairness and to comply with FRCP 23(c)(1),129 which mandates 
that decisions regarding class certification be made as soon as 
practicable, the bellwether trials should take priority over the 
court's other business. 13o On October 28, 1996, Chief Judge 
Richard A. Schell issued an Order Regarding Selection of 
Plaintiffs for Trial. l3l In the Order, Judge Schell selected three 
groups, each consisting of five plaintiffs, for the bellwether tri-
als scheduled to take place during 1997.132 The court sched-
uled the first group for trial commencing on February 24, 
1997.133 The additional two groups would follow at later 
dates. 134 
AHP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the 
commencement of the first bellwether trial. 135 The defendant 
argued that the learned intermediary doctrine insulated it 
from liability to the plaintiffs for failing to warn of the risks of 
Norplant use because it provided adequate warnings to pre-
scribing physicians.136 Subsequent to the defendant's motion, 
the federal district court issued its Preliminary Order on Ap-
plication of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine as it Pertains 
129 See Norplant Litigation, 168 F.R.D. at 579. FRCP 23(c)(1) requires a decision 
regarding class certification to be made as soon as practicable. See id. See also Fed. 
R. Civ. P. (23)(c)(1). Rule 23(c)(1) states: 
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought 
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be 
so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, 
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits. [d. 
130 See Norplant Litigation, 168 F.R.D. at 578. 
131 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996 
WL 631727, at *1 (E.D. Tex. October 28,1996). 132 . See £d. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 
700, 702 (E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation n. 136 
See id. 
20
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to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Order,,).137 
This Order advised the parties that based on the weight of the 
authorities in Texas, the federal district court would apply the 
learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claims. 138 
In response, the plaintiffs argued that the learned interme-
diary doctrine should not apply to their claims against AHP.139 
Specifically, they maintained that prescription contraceptives 
such as Norplant are unlike other prescription drugs because 
physicians do not stand as learned intermediaries between 
consumers and the device's manufacturer.14o Further, they 
argued that AHP's actions displaced those physicians as 
learned intermediaries. 141 These actions included engaging in 
direct-to-consumer advertising, and distributing informational 
and promotional materials to patients through prescribing 
physicians. 142 The federal district court disagreed with the 
plaintiffs' arguments and consequently granted AHP's Motion 
for Summary Judgment.143 
The plaintiffs appealed the federal district court's ruling to 
the Fifth Circuit, again claiming that the learned intermediary 
doctrine should not apply to all of their claims against AHP. 144 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine should not apply to its claims for misrepresenta-
tion and its statutory claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade 
137 See id. The Federal District Court issued its Preliminary Order on Application 
of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine as it Pertains to Defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on February 20,1997. See id. 
138 See id. Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substan-
tive laws of the state in which they are located. In cases involving a drug manufac-
turer's duty to warn, Texas courts apply the learned intermediary doctrine. See id. at 
70l. 139 See id. 
140 
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 704. 
141 
See id. at 705. 
142 See id. at 707-708. 
143 See id. at 702. 
144 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374, 
375 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation II"] 
21
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Practices Act ("DTPA,,).145 Further, the plaintiffs argued the 
defendant's direct-to-consumer marketing campaign demon-
strated that by providing information directly to consumers, it 
assumed a duty to warn consumers directly of its products 
. k 146 TIS S. 
In response, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs' DTPA 
claims were also based on its failure to warn of the risks asso-
ciated with Norplant, and that the learned intermediary doc-
trine should continue to apply.147 In addition, the defendant 
argued that the plaintiffs' argument concerning their adver-
tising campaign was irrelevant because the plaintiffs admitted 
that they had not seen the advertisements prior to using Nor-
plant. 148 After hearing the parties' arguments, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the federal district court's decision to apply the 
doctrine to all of the plaintiffs' claims. 149 
Despite the Fifth Circuit's ruling in its favor, AHP recently 
agreed to pay over fifty million dollars to settle the claims of 
former Norplant users pending in other United States jurisdic-
tions in order to end time-consuming and expensive 
litigation. 150 As a result, on September 23, 1999, the federal 
district court issued an order establishing a schedule for non-
settling plaintiffs to respond to four motions filed by AHP in 
May, 1999.151 In November, 1999, the parties asked the court 
to extend the deadlines for submitting responses since the 
identities of the settling plaintiffs will not be known until 
145 See id. at 377. 
146 See id. at 379. 
147 
See id. at 378. 
148 See id. at 379. 
149 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal 
denied a rehearing of the January 1999 decision on March 9,1999. See id. 150 See Charles Orstein, Norplant company agrees to settle suits, THE DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 1999. Each claimant who filed suit before March 1, 1999 
will receive a cash payment of $1,500, and attorney's fees will be deducted from each 
woman's settlement. See id. 
151 See Order Establishing Schedule for Responses of Non-Settling Plaintiffs, In re 
Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MD 1038. 
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March 31, 2000, due to the time permitted under the settle-
ment agreement. 152 The court agreed to the extension and or-
dered that the plaintiffs file their responses no later than May 
15, 2000.153 Thus, the plaintiffs' response to the defendant's 
motions are not available at the time of this writing. 1M 
V. COURTS' ANALYSIS 
The Norplant Litigation plaintiffs argued against the appli-
cation of the learned intermediary doctrine to their failure to 
warn claims against AHP, citing authorities from various 
United States jurisdictions which created exceptions to the 
doctrine's application. 155 Since the plaintiffs were unable to 
convince the federal district court, the doctrine ultimately ap-
plied to their failure to warn claims against AHP. 156 Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 157 On ap-
peal, the plaintiffs again failed to convince the court that the 
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their failure 
to warn claims involving Norplant.158 
A. DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
In response to AHP's motion, the plaintiffs argued that the 
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their various 
claims against the defendant manufacturer. 159 First, the plain-
tiffs argued that a special exception to the doctrine should ap-
152 
See id. 
153 See id. 
1M See id. 
155 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 
700, 704-705 (E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation r} (citing MacDonald 
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985); Reyes v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
156 See Norplant Litigation [, 955 F. Supp. at 709. 
157 See Norplant Litigation, 165 F.3d at 374. 
158 
See id. at 375. 
159 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 
700, 705 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation [r} .. 
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ply to failure to warn claims since it involves a prescription 
contraceptive. 160 Next, the plaintiffs argued that AHP's ac-
tions, including distributing brochures through physicians and 
engaging in direct-to-consumer advertising, effectively dis::' 
placed physicians as learned intermediaries, rendering the ap-
plication of the doctrine improper. 16l Finally, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that even if the learned intermediary doctrine applied to 
their claims based on failure to warn, it should not apply to 
their claims for misrepresentation and violations of the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA,,).162 
1. Should the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Apply to Failure 
to Warn Claims Involving Prescription Contraceptives? 
The plaintiffs failed to convince the federal district court 
that it should create a special exception to the learned inter~ 
mediary doctrine for prescription contraceptives.163 They relied 
principally on MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.l64 to 
support their contention that prescription contraceptives bear 
particular characteristics that warrant imposing a duty on 
drug manufacturers to directly warn consumers of associated 
risks.165 The plaintiffs argued that prescribing physicians are 
relegated to a passive role when a woman makes the ultimate 
decision to select Norplant as her contraceptive method, and 
therefore, manufacturers are in a better position than physi-
cians to directly warn consumers of the risks inherent in using 
160 See id. at 706. 
161 
See id. at 705-708. 
162 See id. at 709. 
163 
See id. at 707. 
164 See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E. 2d 65 (1985). 
165 See Norplant Litigation 1, 955 F. Supp. at 706 (citing MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 
65). According to MacDonald, these peculiar characteristics include patient's active 
involvement in making the decision to use prescription contraceptives, the substantial 
risks associated with using the drug, the feasibility of direct warnings by the manufac: 
turer to the user, the limited participation of the physician (annual prescription), and 
the possibility that communications between the physician and patient may be too 
scanty standing alone to fully warn patients of the risks. See id. 
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its product. 166 In response, the court found that physicians 
consistently advise patients of the various advantages and dis-
advantages of prescription contraceptives even though the 
drugs are elective. 167 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment, reasoning that the fact that the patient makes the final 
decision as to which contraceptive method to use does not ren-
der the doctrine inapplicable.16s The federal district court con-
cluded that the learned intermediary doctrine applies to fail-
ure to warn claims regarding prescription contraceptives 
whenever a physician is involved, a relationship that is inher-
ent in the surgical nature of Norplant.169 
2. Did the Defendant's Conduct Result in the Displacement of 
the Prescribing Physician? 
Next, the plaintiffs relied on Reyes u. Wyeth Laboratories170 
to support their argument that the learned intermediary doc-
trine should not apply to Norplant because AHP's distribution 
of informational materials through prescribing physicians ab-
rogated the physicians' roles as learned intermediaries. l7l In 
Reyes, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the defen-
dant pharmaceutical manufacturer was not insulated from li-
ability for the adverse side effects of its polio vaccine because a . 
physician did not assume a learned intermediary role.172 
Rather, a nurse dispensed the polio vaccine to children and a 
physician did not confer with parents about the possible side 
effects of the vaccine. 173 The federal district court distin-
166 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 706. In the twelve years following the 
MacDonald decision, no other United States jurisdiction followed the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court ruling. See id. 
167 
See id. at 707. 
16S . 
See ld. 
169 
See id. 
170 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 705 (citing Reyes v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
171 
See id. 
172 
See id. 
173 
See id. 
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guished Reyes, where the learned intermediary doctrine was 
inapplicable because the physician-patient relationship was 
non-existent. 174 In contrast, the physicians in the Norplant 
Litigation were clearly involved in the prescribing and im-
planting of Norplant. 175 The court elaborated further, holding 
that although AHP provided physicians with a Norplant Pa-
tient Brochure to review with their patients, this brochure did 
not abrogate the patient-physician relationship.176 Instead, the 
brochure reinforced the existence of that relationship by en-
couraging patients to discuss the contents of the brochure with 
a doctor before deciding to use Norplant. 177 The federal district 
court concluded that, as was the case in Reyes, only a doctor 
can remove himself from the role of learned intermediary.17s 
The information AHP provided to physicians clearly did not 
t h 't t' 179 crea e suc SI ua IOn. 
3. Did the Marketing Campaign Impose a Direct Duty on AHP 
to Warn Norplant Users of Possible Adverse Side Effects? 
The federal district court did not resolve whether AHP's di-
rect-to-consumer advertising campaign created an exception to 
the learned intermediary doctrine. ISO The plaintiffs argued 
that AHP had a duty to directly warn consumers of both the 
benefits and possible risks of its product since it elected to by-
pass physicians by advertising products directly to 
consumers. lSI However, although AHP printed several "puff 
pieces" in consumer magazines that did not include warnings 
of side effects, the plaintiffs admitted that they had not seen 
any of the advertisements before using Norplant. 1s2 The fed-
174 
See id. 
175 .. . See Norplant L,t,gatwn I, 955 F. Supp. at 705. 
176 
See id. 
177 See id. at 706. 
178 . See ,d. at 706. 
179 S 'd 
ee' . 
ISO .. . See Norplant La'gatwn I, 955 F. Supp. at 708. 
lSI 
See id. at 707-708. 
1S2 
See id. 
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eral district court determined that on this basis, the plaintiffs' 
argument concerning AHP's direct marketing efforts was with-
t . 183 ou ment. 
4. Did Defendant's Distribution of Promotional Materials 
Through a Physician Displace the Learned Intermediary Doc-
trine? 
The federal district court ruled that AHP's efforts to dis-
tribute promotional materials to consumers through physicians 
did not displace the physicians as learned intermediaries.184 
AHP provided promotional videotapes and pamphlets to physi-
cians "disguised" as·objective and factual patient informational 
brochures. 185 The plaintiffs argued that these promotional ma-
terials were deceptive because they highlighted the benefits of 
Norplant, but not the potential side effects. 186 Further, the 
plaintiffs argued that since their decisions to use Norplant 
were made after reviewing these deceptive materials, physi-
cians did not act as learned intermediaries.187 Therefore, AHP 
assumed a duty to. directly warn consumers of its product's 
risks. 188 The court disagreed and instead concluded that the 
promotional materials merely facilitated communication be-
tween physicians and patients.189 AHP's distribution of these 
materials did not reflect a voluntarily assumption of a duty to 
directly warn patients of Norplant's potential side effects. 19o 
Since AHP dIstributed the materials to physicians, as learned 
intermediaries, they have a duty to review materials to ensure 
that the materials provide accurate information before passing 
them on to patients.19l Thus, the court declined to conclude 
183 See Norplant Litigation, 955 F. Supp. at 708. 
184 See id. at 708-709. 
185 See id. at 708. 
186 
See id. 
187 See id. 
188 See Norplant Litigation, 955 F. Supp. at 708. 
189 
See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
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that the promotional materials distributed by AHP displaced 
the role of prescribing physicians as learned intermediaries.192 
5. Does the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Apply to Each of the 
Plaintiffs' Claims? 
The federal district court determined that failure to warn 
was the foundation for all of the plaintiffs' claims against 
AHP. 193 As a result, the learned intermediary doctrine applied 
to all the claims. 194 Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs were required to satisfy a two-prong test. 195 The first 
prong required the plaintiffs to prove that AHP's warnings to 
prescribing physicians failed to adequately warn of the side 
effects they each experienced.196 To satisfy the second prong, 
the plaintiffs had to prove that but for the inadequacies of 
AHP's warnings, their treating physicians would not have pre-
scribed Norplant to them. 197 
AHP argued that the plaintiffs could not avoid summary 
judgment since the court did not need to reach the first-prong 
issue concerning the adequacy of its warnings to physicians 
because the plaintiffs could not satisfy the second prong. 19B 
Rather, the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiffs' 
physicians were fully aware of the alleged potential side effects 
and their severity before prescribing Norplant. 199 The plain-
tiffs unsuccessfully argued that their physicians would not 
have prescribed Norplant if they had received additional in-
formation contained in studies, internal AHP memoranda and 
192 
See id. at 709. 
193 .. . See Norplant Lltlgatwn 1, 955 F. Supp. at 709. 
194 See id. The plaintiffs alleged a number of causes of action including strict li-
abiiity, negligence, misrepresentation, implied warranty and a claim under the DTPA. 
See id. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
19B See Norplant Litigation 1, 955 F. Supp. at 710. 
199 See id. 
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letters unavailable to the physicians.20o At trial, all of the 
plaintiffs' prescribing physicians testified that none of the ad-
ditional information would have changed their minds about 
prescribing Norplant to the plaintiffs.201 Since the plaintiffs 
were unable to prove that AHP's warnings were inadequate, 
the plaintiffs were not able to satisfy the second-prong of the 
two-prong test. 202 Thus the federal district court did not need 
to reach the second prong causation question.203 
As a last resort, the plaintiffs argued that their claims for 
misrepresentation and violations of the DTPA were not actu-
ally based on failure to warn, and therefore, the learned inter-
mediary doctrine should not apply.204 Further, the plaintiffs 
claimed that they should be able to sue AHP directly on these 
. . 
two theories because AHP voluntarily distributed deceptive 
and misleading patient information materials to physiciaris.205 
The federal district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and 
ruled that the alleged misrepresentation or the allegedly false, 
misleading and deceptive nature of these materials was· not 
that the information was inaccurate, but rather that AHP 
failed to adequately warn of Norplant's side eifects.206 Thus, 
the court concluded that failure to warn was definitely the ba-
sis of all of the plaintiffs' various claims against AHP.207 
6. The District Court's Conclusion 
The court concluded that prescription contraceptives should 
be treated the same as any other prescription drug regarding 
the application of .the learned intermediary doctrine as a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer's defense to failure to warn 
200 
See id. 
201 See id. at 710-711. 
202 .. . See Norplant LItIgatIOn I, 955 F. Supp. at 711. 
203 See id. 
204 
See id. 
205 See id. at 709. 
206 
See id. 
207 Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 709. 
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claims.208 Although the plaintiffs argued that AHP's efforts to 
distribute product information brochures to consumers 
through physicians displaced the medical professionals as 
learned intermediaries, the court did not find the argument 
compelling.209 In addition, the applicability of the learned in-
termediary doctrine when manufacturers engage in direct-to-
consumer advertising remains unanswered by the Norplant 
Litigation. 210 Further, AHP's efforts to distribute promotional 
materials through prescribing physicians did not render the 
doctrine inapplicable since the court found that these materi-
als actually facilitated dialogues. between physicians and pa-
tients.2l1 Finally, the court concluded that failure to warn was 
the basis of each of the plaintiffs' claims against AHP.212 Thus 
the learned intermediary doctrine protected the defendant 
from liability on all counts.213 As a result of its findings, the 
federal district court granted AHP's Summary Judgment Mo-
tion, despite the plaintiffs many arguments against applying 
the learned intermediary doctrine.214 
B. PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the federal district 
court erred in granting AHP's Motion for Summary 
Judgment.215 Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the 
court erred by applying the learned intermediary doctrine to 
their DTPA claim against AHP.216 Further, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that because AHP's direct-to-consumer advertising cam-
208 See id. at 707. 
209 
See id. at 706. 
210 
See id. at 708. 
211 
See id. at 708 .. 212 
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 709. 
213 See id. 
214 
See id. at 711. 
215 
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 376. 
216 
See id. at 377. 
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paign abrogated the role of their prescribing physicians, it as-
sumed a duty to directly warn consumers of Norplant's inher-
ent risks.217 Finally, the plaintiffs introduced a new theory for 
imposing liability on AHP by arguing that the learned inter-
mediary doctrine should not apply when the Federal Drug 
Administration recommends manufacturer warnings for a par-
ticular drug.218 The Fifth Circuit ultimately disagreed, af-
firming the federal district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment in favor of AHP.219 
1. Should the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Apply to the 
Plaintiffs' Claims Under the DTPA? 
The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the 
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their claim 
under the DTP A. 220 The plaintiffs claim relied specifically on 
DTPA Section 17.46(b), which makes it unlawful to misrepre-
sent the nature of goods sold in Texas.221 The plaintiffs alleged 
that AHP violated the DTPA by representing that Norplant 
had certain attributes that it does not,222 and representing that 
Norplant was of a particular standard or quality when it was 
not.223 Moreover, the Norplant Litigation plaintiffs claimed 
that AHP violated Section 17.46(b)(23) of the DTPA, which 
makes it unlawful for manufacturers to fail to disclose infor-
mation it knows at the time of the transaction that, if dis-
closed, would cause the consumer not to enter into the transac-
217 
See id. 
218 
See id. 
219 
See id. at 380. 
220 .. . See Norplant Lltlgatzon II, 165 F.3d at 377. The Federal District Court did not 
address the issue because the court concluded that the DTPA claim was equivalent to 
the other common law claims and therefore the learned intermediary doctrine applied. 221 
See id. Section 17.46(b) of the DTPA makes it unlawful to misrepresent that 
goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, bene-
fits, or quantities which they do not have. See id. 222 . 
See id. 
223 
See id. See also Texas Business and Commerce Code, Chapter 17 § 17.46(b)(7) 
(1967). Section 17.46(b)(7) prohibits representing that goods or services are of a par-
ticular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if 
they are of another. 
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tion: 224 When the defendant engages in the false, misleading or 
deceptive practices specifically set forth in subsection 17.46(b), 
a Texas consumer may maintain an action for economic or 
mental anguish damages. 225 The Norplant Litigation plaintiffs 
claimed to have a cause of action under the DTPA for AHP's 
deceptive practices, without the burden of proof requirements 
and common law defenses normally applicable to common law 
I . 226 . calms. 
The plaintiffs contended that the learned intermediary doc-
trine should not apply to their statutory DTPA claims because 
it is a defense to common law failure to warn claims. 227 There-
foreJ the doctrine does not apply to a statutory DTPA claim. 228 
AHP responded by arguing that the learned intermediary doc-
trine is not actually a defense, but rather a rule of law defining 
a pharmaceutical manufacturer's duty to provide adequate 
warnings to prescribing physicians regarding its product.229 
The court found evidence to support AHP's argument, as lower 
Texas courts applied the doctrine to :QTPA claims in the 
past.230 On the basis of these Texas decisions, the Fifth Circuit 
224 
. See Texas Business and Commerce Code, Chapter 17 § 17.46(b)(23) (1967). Sec-
tion 17.46(b)(23) prohibits failing to disclose information concerning goods or services 
which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such infor-
mation was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed. 
225 . 
See Texas Business and Commerce Code, Chapter 17 § 17.50 (1967). In order to 
recover damages under the DTPA, consumers must also show that they relied on the 
false, misleading or deceptive practice to their detriment. 
226 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 377 (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W. 
2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980». 
227 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 377. 
228 , 
See id. The plaintiffs argued that the DTP A is not a codification of the common 
law. Rather, its purpose is to provide consumers with a cause of action for deceptive 
practices without the burden of proof and defenses encountered in a common law 
fraud or breach of warranty suit. See id. 
229 See id. at 378. 
230 .. 
See id. (citing Rivers v. American Home Products Corp., No. 342-160538-95 
dated April 9, 1998.». In Rivers, a lower Texas state court applied the learned inter-
mediiuy doctrine in the context of a Norplant claim under the DTPA. 
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held that the learned intermediary doctrine also applied to the 
plaintiffs' DTPA claim.231 
2. Do Public Policy Considerations Require Imposing a Duty to 
Warn? 
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that AHP should have 
a duty to directly warn consumers of the risks inherent in 
Norplant use because physicians playa reduced role in select-
ing the contraceptive for their patients.232 The court concluded 
that although patients participate with physicians in their con-
traceptive choices, Norplant is nevertheless a prescription 
drug.233 The court found the plaintiffs' argument unpersuasive 
since the record clearly established that physicians played a 
significant role in prescribing Norplant and educating patients 
about the risks and benefits of the device.234 
3. Did AHP's Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Norplant Im-
pose a Duty to Directly Warn Consumers? 
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument 
that AHP's direct-to-consumer marketing efforts displaced 
their prescribing physicians as learned intermediaries.235 The 
plaintiffs claimed that since AHP engaged in aggressive mar-
keting of Norplant, it should be held liable for failing to pro-
vide adequate warnings in conjunction with that marketing.236 
The court held that even if an exception to the learned inter-
mediary doctrine applied in this case, summary judgment was 
proper because the plaintiffs never saw any of AHP's N orplant 
advertisements before implantation.237 Additionally, the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that even if the plaintiffs had seen the adver-
231 
See id. 
232 
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d 374 at 379. 
233 See id. 
234 
See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379. 
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tisements, their argument would still fail because two courts, 
applying Texas law, concluded that the learned intermediary 
doctrine applies as long a physician-patient relationship 
. t 238 eXls s. 
4. Does the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Continue to Apply 
Even When the Federal Drug Administration Recommends 
Manufacturer Warnings? . 
The plaintiffs further argued that the warnings on Norplant 
packaging recommended by the FDA created an exception to 
the learned intermediary doctrine.239 Citing an Oklahoma Su-
preme Court decision, the plaintiffs contended that when po-
tential side effects of prescription drugs are so serious that the 
FDA requires warnings, the doctrine should not apply.240 The 
Fifth Circuit called this rationale "counter-intuitive" because 
one reason for the learned intermediary doctrine is to encour-
age pharmaceutical companies to make drugs available to con-
sumers.
241 Despite the potentially harmful side effects of cer-
tain products, pharmaceutical manufacturers are shielded 
from liability when the drug is prescribed by a properly trained 
physician.242 Further, the court found that it had no reason to 
believe that Texas would be inclined to follow Oklahoma's ex-
ception to the learned intermediary doctrine in this 
situation.243 Finally, the court noted that the FDA has explic-
itly stated that labeling requirements should not affect civil 
tort liability.244 Ultimately, the court found the plaintiffs' ar-
238 See id. (citing Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987». 239 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379. 
240 See id. (citing Basel v. Edwards Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997». 
241 
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379. 
242 
See id. 
243 
See id. 
244 See id. 
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gument unpersuasive since the FDA did not actually mandate 
any particular labeling for Norplant.245 
5. The Fifth Circuit's Conclusion 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's granting of 
AHP's Motion for Summary Judgment.246 The court held that 
the learned intermediary doctrine applied to all of the plain-
tiffs claims against AHP, including their claims under the 
DTPA.247 Further, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that public policy considerations require imposing a 
duty to warn on AHP.248 Since the plaintiffs did not see any of 
AHP's Norplant advertisements before implantation, the court 
did not directly address the issue concerning the applicability 
of the learned intermediary doctrine when drug manufacturers 
engage in direct-to-consumer advertising.249 Notably, the court 
mentioned in dictum that the learned intermediary doctrine 
would likely apply even if the plaintiffs had seen the adver-
tisements.25o Finally, the court held that it should not carve 
out another exception to the learned intermediary doctrine in 
cases where the FDA requires warning labels, especially since 
no such warnings were ever required for Norplant.251 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit issued opin-
ions in the lengthy Norplant Litigation that followed common 
law precedent regarding failure to warn claims involving pre-
scription contraceptives.252 Both courts appropriately applied 
245 
See at 379-380. 
246 
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375. 
247 See id. at 378. 
248 See id. at 379. 
249 
See id. at 379. 
250 
See id. at 379 
251 
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379-380. 
252 
See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 
CE.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Nor plant Litigation r]. See also In re Norplant Contra-
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the learned intermediary doctrine to insulate AHP from a duty 
to directly warn the plaintiffs of the risks inherent in using 
Norplant. 253 However, both courts left unanswered the ques-
tion regarding whether the learned intermediary doctrine ap-
plies when pharmaceutical manufacturers engage in direct-to-
d t·· 254 consumer aver Ismg. 
A. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE SHOULD APPLY TO 
NORPLANT BECAUSE A DOCTOR MUST SURGICALLY IMPLANT THE 
DEVICE 
Both the federal district court and Fifth Circuit correctly 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument, based on Reyes v. Wyeth 
Laboratories,255 that prescribing physicians do not play an ac-
tive role in selecting Norplant as a patient's contraceptive 
method.256 The plaintiffs argued that an exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine should apply to Norplant pre-
scriptions because, in Reyes, the Fifth Circuit created an excep-
tion to the learned intermediary doctrine when a defendant 
manufacturer clearly knows that a physician does not adminis-
ter its vaccines.257 Therefore, these physicians do not in fact 
stand as learned intermediaries between the manufacturer 
and those receiving its polio vaccines.258 The physician-patient 
relationship in Reyes, however, is distinguished from the phy-
sician-patient relationship in the Norplant Litigation where 
the physicians actually participated in prescribing and im-
ceptive Products Liabiity Litigation, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Nor-
plant Litigation II"] 
253 
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
165 F.3d at 380. 
254 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 708. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
165 F.3d at 379. 
255 See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). 
256 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
165 F.3d at 379. 
257 
See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277. 
258 See id. The vaccine causing the plaintiffs infant daughter to contract polio was 
dispensed by a nurse in a county health clinic without any warning of possible adverse 
side effects. See id. 
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planting Norplant.259 Unlike that in Reyes, the existence of a 
physician-patient relationship was undisputed in the Norplant 
Litigation.260 
The plaintiffs argued that physicians played a diminished 
role in prescribing the device because AHP distributed patient 
information brochures through physicians.261 However, unlike 
the parents in Reyes, who received no warnings and had no 
contact with a physician, AHP distributed brochures to physi-
cians who gave them to patients.262 These brochures urged 
women to discuss the risks and benefits of the device with 
their doctors.263 Further, physicians dispensed Norplant to the 
plaintiffs only in the context of a physician-patient relation- . 
ship, as evidenced by the fact that Norplant must be surgically 
inserted.264 For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit correctly af-
firmed the federal district court decision to apply the learned 
intermediary doctrine to N orplant. 265 
B. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE APPLIES TO 
N ORPLANT BECAUSE PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVES ARE 
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM OTHER PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
The Norplant Litigation plaintiffs argued that the unique 
nature of prescription contraceptives warrants creating an ex-
ception to the learned intermediary doctrine.266 The plaintiffs 
relied primarily on MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
C 267 h· 268 h D ld orp. to support t elr argument. T e Mac ona excep-
259 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 705. 
260 See id. 
, 261 
See id. 
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
264 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 705. 
265 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 711. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
374 F.3d at 380. 
266 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 707. 
, 267 See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). 
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tion to the learned intermediary doctrine requires manufactur-
ers of prescription contraceptives to provide warnings directly 
to patients because physicians play a diminished role in pre-
scribing these drugs to their patients.269 However, both courts 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they should create an 
exception to the doctrine under MacDonald, concluding that 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court based its exception on 
flawed reasoning. 270 The federal district court decided not to 
follow the MacDonald exception to the learned intermediary 
doctrine for the following reasons.271 First, MacDonald is not a 
widely followed opinion and, thus, does not provide compelling 
support for the plaintiffs' argument.272 Second, MacDonald did 
not present a situation similar to the Norplant Litigation be-
cause the warnings AHP provided to physicians were ade-
quate, undermining the basis for the MacDonald exception to 
the doctrine.273 Finally, an Eighth Circuit case, Reaves v. Or-
tho Pharmaceutical Corp., further undermined the plaintiffs' 
argument because it represents the majority view regarding 
the continuing application of the doctrine to prescription con-
traceptives in United States jurisdictions.274 Thus, both courts 
in the Norplant Litigation correctly followed the majority view 
for applying the learned intermediary doctrine to failure to 
warn claims as outlined in the Reaves opinion. 275 
268 
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 706. 
269 See MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69. 
270 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
165 F.3d at 375. 
271 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 706-707. 
272 See id. at 706. 
273 
See id. at 711. 
274 See id. at 704. 
275 
See id. at 707. 
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1. MacDonald Did Not Provide an Adequate Basis for the 
Plaintiffs' Argument Because it is Not a Widely Followed Opin-
£on 
The. Fifth Circuit correctly determined that the plaintiffs' 
reliance on MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. was 
misplaced.276 The federal district court's analysis of the plain-
tiffs' argument began by emphasizing that no state or federal 
court had adopted the MacDonald rationale for creating an 
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for prescription 
contraceptives in the twelve years following the decision.277 In 
MacDonald, the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply 
because the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the 
patient's active participation in the decision to use oral contra-
ceptives diminished the role of the prescribing physician as a 
learned intermediary.278 However, the courts in the Norplant 
Litigation reasoned that they could draw no principled distinc-
tion between Norplant and other prescription drugs.279 The 
fact that a woman plays an active role in electing to use N or-
plant to prevent pregnancy does not diminish the physician's 
role in determining each patient's suitability for using the de-
vice and counseling her as to its risks and benefits.280 As such, 
the court correctly disagreed with the plaintiffs' diminished 
role argument, noting that the fact that N orplant is elective 
and other prescription drugs are therapeutic should not affect 
the application of the learned intermediary doctrine.281 Con-
sidering the court's reasoning that prescription contraceptives 
such as Norplant are indistinguishable from other prescription 
drugs, the plaintiffs' diminished role argument under Mac-
276 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 706 (citing MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 
65). 
277 See Norplant Litigation 1, 955 F. Supp. at 706. 
278 
See id. 
279 
See id. at 707. 
280 
See id. at 707. 
281 See id. at 707 
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Donald was particularly unpersuasive since a physician must 
surgically implant the device.282 
2. Norplant's Warnings Were Adequate and Did Not Warrant 
Imposing a Duty to Directly Warn the Plaintiffs' on AHP 
The MacDonald facts differ from those in the Norplant Liti-
gation in another crucial way.283 In the Norplant Litigation, 
AHP clearly warned prescribing physicians of the common, 
well-known, and reversible side effects that the plaintiffs al-
leged as a result of using Norplant. 284 Conversely, in Mac-
Donald, the information booklet included with each pill dis-
penser warned of the risks of life threatening blood clotting in 
some women, but failed to warn specifically of the possibility of 
stroke. 285 MacDonald testified that she did not know that the 
risk of blood clotting included this serious risk, and that she 
would not have used the drug if she had known.286 The Mac-
Donald jury held the defendant manufacturer liable to Mac-
Donald because its pills caused her injury and its failure to 
adequately and directly warn MacDonald was the proximate 
fh .. 287 cause 0 er Injury. 
In contrast, the product information booklet distributed to 
N orplant users and their prescribing physicians clearly warned 
282 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707. 
283 See id. at 706 (citing MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 65). 
284 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 374. Side effects suffered by the plain-
tiffs in the Norplant Litigation included severe headaches, mood swings, depression, 
nausea, acne, arm pain, numbness, breast tenderness, weight gain, hair loss, cramps 
and bleeding irregularities. See id. at 376. See also Defendant's No.2 Memorandum 
in Support of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant 
Labeling at 3, Norplant Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038). 285 . 
See MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 67. 
286 See id. 
287 
See id. at 72. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned that the jury's ver-
dict on the inadequacy of the warnings was reasonable. In light of their common ex-
perience and MacDonald's testimony, the absence of reference to the word "stroke" in 
the warning may have unduly minimized the warnings impact or failed to make the 
nature of the risk reasonably comprehensible to the average consumer. See id. at 71. 
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users of the side effects alleged by the plaintiffs.288 For exam-
ple, all five of the bellwether plaintiffs claimed they suffered 
irregular menstrual bleeding.289 Moreover, AHP listed this risk 
as the first potential adverse reaction in its Norplant patient 
information materials.290 Despite the risks, all five of the first 
bellwether plaintiffs' prescribing physicians testified that they 
received adequate warning of possible side effects and still be-
lieved that Norplant was a safe and effective product.291 Un-
like the defendant in MacDonald who received inadequate 
warnings, AHP explicitly provided adequate warnings of po-
tential side effects in its Norplant brochure.292 Thus, since the 
Norplant warnings to physicians were accurate, both courts 
correctly determined that the learned intermediary doctrine 
should apply to the plaintiffs' claims against AHP.293 
3. Both Courts Correctly Followed Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceu-
tical Corporation Because it Represents the Majority View 
The Norplant Litigation holding is further supported by 
Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation. 294 In Reaves, the 
plaintiff lost her leg as a result of a serious condition she de-
veloped while taking oral contraceptives.295 Despite the severe 
nature of her injury, the court in Reaves declined to create a 
288 See also Defendant's No. 2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling, Norplant Litigation at 3, 
955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038). 
289 • See id. at 12. Most of the women experienced irregular bleeding when using 
Norplant. See id. 
290 See id. at 12. 
291 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 710-711. Plaintiffs claimed that AHP 
withheld information from physicians about Norplant side effects. The physicians 
examined medical studies, Wyeth internal memoranda and letters that contained 
information that was not available at the time they inserted Norplant into the plain-
tiffs. The physicians claimed that none of the new information would have changed 
their minds about prescribing Norplant. See id. 
292 See id. at 711. 
293 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II, 
165 F.3d at 375. 
294 
See Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
295 
See id. at 1288. 
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special exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for oral 
contraceptives, finding the drugs indistinguishable from other 
prescription drugs.296 The court held that the role of physicians 
in prescribing contraceptives is identical to their role in pre-
scribing other drugs, because with both types of drugs physi-
cians play an active role in determining whether their patients 
will be successful users of a particular product.297 
However, the Norplant Litigation presents a less persuasive 
situation than Reaves for creating an exception to the learned 
intermediary doctrine. 298 In Reaves, the plaintiff became per-
manently disabled as a. result of using oral contraceptives.299 
The plaintiffs in the Norplant Litigation, however, alleged un-
comfortable, but basically reversible side effects, including, 
headaches, mood swings, depression, nausea, acne, arm pain, 
numbness, breast tenderness, weight gain, hair loss, cramps 
and menstrual cycle irregularities.aoo The Reaves court was 
unwilling to create an exception to the doctrine, despite the 
serious injuries Reaves suffered, because a physician still acted 
as an learned intermediary when prescribing the drug.301 
Similarly, despite the numerous side effects alleged by the 
plaintiffs, the courts in the Norplant Litigation concluded that 
although prescription contraceptives are elective and have po-
tentially serious side effects, these characteristics do not di-
minish the role of the prescribing physician as a learned in-
termediary.302 Therefore, the elective nature of Norplant does 
not warrant placing a duty on manufacturers to directly warn 
consumers of the device's inherent risks.303 Both courts in the 
Norplant Litigation correctly followed the majority view out-
lined in Reaves, as the applicability of the learned intermedi-
296 
See id. at 1291. 
297 . 
See zd. at 1290. 
298 .. . See Norplant Lalgatlon II, 165 F.3d at 375. 
299 
See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1288. 300 . 
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375. 
301 See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1291. 302 . 
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707 
303 
See id. 
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ary doctrine is determined according to role of prescribing phy-
sicians, and not by the severity of the alleged side effects.304 
C. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE SHOULD CONTINUE 
TO APPLY WHEN PHARMACEUTICAL MANuFACTURERS 
ADVERTISE PRODUCTS TO CONSUMERS 
A few months after the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
learned intermediary doctrine should apply to the plaintiffs' 
claims in the Norplant Litigation, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court specifically rejected the Norplant Litigation holding in 
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 305 The court in Perez held 
that the learned intermediary doctrine should not shield a 
pharmaceutical company from liability for failure to warn of 
Norplant's risks since it engaged in direct-to-consumer adver-
tising.306 The Perez majority concluded that direct-to-consumer 
advertising undermines the very foundation of the learned in-
termediary doctrine.307 The court based its conclusion on its 
assumption that AHP's direct-to-consumer advertising of Nor-
plant demonstrated that consumers participated directly in 
their health care decisions, invalidating the premise that the 
physician plays an active role in selecting a woman's contra-
ceptive method.30s Further, the court held that consumer-
directed advertising infringes upon the patient-physician rela-
tionship by encouraging patients to ask for products by 
name.
309 In addition, the court noted that consumer-directed 
advertising undermines the view that prescription drugs and 
devices and their potential adverse effects are too complex to 
be effectively communicated to consumers.310 Conversely, if 
presented with a legitimate claim involving the direct-to-
304 See id. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375. 
305 See Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
306 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1249. 
307 
See id. at 1256. 
30S 
See id. 
309 
See id. 
310 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256 
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consumer advertising issue addressed in Perez, the courts in 
the Norplant Litigation would have applied the learned inter-
mediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claims against AHP.311 
In the Norplant Litigation, the Fifth Circuit noted in dictum 
that the learned intermediary doctrine should continue to ap-
ply when pharmaceutical manufacturers engage in direct-to-
consumer advertising.312 The court based its statement on the 
premise that the doctrine continues to apply as long as the 
physician-patient relationship exists.3l3 Throughout the Nor-
plant Litigation opinions, the courts held contrary to Perez, 
concluding that even if women make the ultimate decision 
about their method of contraception, physicians still consis-
tently advise patients of the various advantages and disadvan-
tages of a particular method.314 
The learned intermediary doctrine should 'continue to de-
spite the fact that AHP engaged in direct-to-consumer adver-
tising of Norplant, since physicians remain actively involved in 
prescribing and implanting the device.315 In the Norplant Liti-
gation, the courts concluded that AHP's efforts to distribute 
informational and promotional materials through physicians 
did not undermine the applicability of the doctrine because, 
despite these efforts, physicians played an active role in pre-
scribing Norplant. 316 As such, the courts in the Norplant Liti-
gation concluded that even if patients are actively involved in 
choosing to use Norplant, the device is nevertheless only avail-
able by prescription and, therefore, physicians must be in-
volved in the contraceptive selection process.317 In addition to 
prescribing the device, physicians must surgically implant 
311 . See !d. at 1268. 
312 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379. 
313 See id. at 379. 
314 See id. at 379. 
315 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 709. 
316 See id. at 706. 
317 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d 374 at 379. 
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Norplant under the skin of a woman's upper arm.318 Conse-
quently, even if the patient learned about Norplant from a 
magazine advertisement, the prescribing physician remains 
responsible for educating each patient about Norplant, as-
sessing whether she will be a successful Norplant user, and 
performing the surgical insertion procedure.319 Further, like 
the Norplant Litigation opinion, the dissenting opinion in 
Perez concluded that even if the advertisements influenced a 
woman's ultimate choice to use Norplant, the physician-patient 
relationship remains implicit in prescribing the drug and per-
forming the surgical procedure.32o Therefore, the reasoning 
presented in the Norplant Litigation, as the dissenting opinion 
in Pere, correctly characterizes a physician's active involve-
ment in prescribing Norplant.321 As such, if permitted to an-
swer the question presented by AHP's direct-to-consumer 
marketing campaign, the courts should have applied the 
learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claim.322 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of the learned in-
termediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims, 
excusing AHP from the duty to directly warn Norplant users of 
the possible risks of its product.323 The court based its conclu-
sion on the fact that prescribing physicians clearly played an 
active role in prescribing and implanting the device.324 Thus, 
318 
See id. 
319 
See id. 
320 
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1268. 
321 
See Norplant Litigation, 165 F.3d at 379. 
322 
See id. 
323 
See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374, 
380 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation II''}. 
324 See id. at 379 
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because the learned intermediary doctrine applied, the first 
bellwether trial ended before it reached ajury.325 
The decision reached by the federal district court and the 
Fifth Circuit in the Norplant Litigation were consistent with 
the common law of most United States jurisdictions.326 These 
decisions to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to the 
plaintiffs' claims reinforces the position of pharmaceutical 
companies with regard to their duty to directly warn consum-
ers of the side effects of prescribed products.327 Simply stated, 
the rule remains that if a pharmaceutical company provides 
adequate warnings to physicians who prescribe its drugs, it is 
not directly liable to consumers for failure to warn of the risks 
inherent in using their products.328 
Although AHP admits no fault or responsibility for the 
plaintiffs' suffering, it is attempting to end this long and ex-
pensive litigation by settling with the plaintiffs in the Norplant 
Litigation.329 It remains unclear as of this writing whether all 
of the plaintiffs involved in the Norplant Litigation will agree 
to settle their claims against AHP.330 Until the uncertainty 
325 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 
700, 711 (E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation r}. See also Norplant 
Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 380. 
326 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 707 (citing Reaves v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Terhune v. AH. Robins Co., 90 
Wash 2d 9 (1978); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988); 
Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A2d 398 (Del. 1989); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 
F. Supp. 417 (D. D.C. 1991); Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); 
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988); West v. Searle & 
Co., (304 Ark. 33 (1991); Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 169 Ill.2d 234 (1996); 
Humes v. Clinton, 246 Kan. 590 (1990». 
327 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379. 
328 • See Id. at 376. 
329 . See Charles Orstem, Norplant company agrees to settle suits, THE DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 1999. Each plaintiff should receive around $1,500 less 
attorney's fees. 
330 See Order Establishing Schedule for Responses of Non-Settling Plaintiffs, In re 
Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MD 1038. 
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regarding the applicability of the learned intermediary doc-
trine to failure to warn claims against pharmaceutical compa-
nies is eliminated, complex and expensive litigation such as 
that involving Norplant will continue to address these issues. 
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